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Development and Examination of Fog
Computing-Based Encrypted Control System
Kaoru Teranishi , Naoki Shimada , and Kiminao Kogiso
Abstract—This letter develops a fog computing-based encrypted
control system in a practical industrial setting. The developed sys-
tem conceals controller gains and signals over communication links
using multiplicative homomorphic encryption to prevent eaves-
dropping attacks. Experimental validation confirms the feasibility
of position servo control for the motor-driven stage with the de-
veloped system in terms of performance degradation, parameter
variation, and processing time. The developed system inherits its
stability regardless of whether plant parameters fluctuate or not
even after the controller gains and signals are encrypted. Further-
more, although processing time becomes longer by increasing a
key length of encryption, degradation of control performance is
improved simultaneously.
Index Terms—Networked robots, robot safety, motion control,
encrypted control, fog computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
C LOUD-BASED control systems [1], in which controlleddevices are connected to a communication network to be
monitored and controlled in the cloud, are gaining popularity.
Control as a Service (CaaS) for automotive control, a cloud-
based control concept, was proposed in [2]. The authors of [3]
introduced RobotControl as a Service. This concept also real-
izes higher-layer control (e.g., motion planning) for industrial
robots. Rapyuta [4] cooperating with RoboEarth [5] is Platform
as a Service (PaaS) for cloud robotics applications. The main
advantage of these architectures lies in their improved flexi-
bility, scalability, and efficiency over conventional networked
systems [6].
On the other hand, lower-layer control (e.g., servo control of
actuators) still needs local execution, and a cloud architecture
is not suitable for such control because of latencies between
controlled devices connected to the cloud [7], [8]. This issue
can be solved by fog computing [9], which is a decentralized
computing architecture with an intermediate layer called fog.
Fog computing-based control systems reduce communication
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delay and retain the advantages of cloud-based control systems,
that is, the controller does not need to be installed locally,
and operators can remotely monitor the plant condition and
easily change the control law. Additionally, the fog aggregates
and cleans dirty data to support analytics in the cloud [10].
Fog computing offers many potential benefits, especially for
real-time applications, although security and privacy issues in
the fog persist similar to the case of the cloud [11]–[13].
Attacks on cyber-physical systems, such as networked control
systems, are more damaging than attacks on information sys-
tems because physical systems can directly affect real environ-
ments [14], [15]. Adversaries can eavesdrop, invade, and falsify
the system if security measures have not been implemented
sufficiently. The authors of [16] verified the risks of manipulators
by actual attacks, which tamper with controller gains. It is critical
to obfuscate controller gains and to conceal signals from the
attacks.
Encrypted control [17], a fusion of cryptography and control
theory, is a promising methodology to improve the security
of control systems by reducing risks of eavesdropping attacks.
Eavesdropping attacks aim to steal information of control sys-
tems in order to execute more severe attacks, such as zero dynam-
ics attacks, in the future [15]. In encrypted control systems using
ElGamal encryption [18], which is multiplicative homomorphic
encryption, control inputs are calculated in ciphertext from
encrypted controller parameters, encrypted sensor data, and an
encrypted reference without decryption. Additionally, encrypted
control can be applied for the detection of replay attacks and
controller or signal falsification attacks [19].
The encrypted control system with Paillier encryption [20],
which is additive homomorphic encryption was proposed
in [21], [22]. The authors of [23] provided the signal con-
cealment method with fully homomorphic encryption. Homo-
morphic encryption is utilized as a security measure in control
systems, as noted above. However, it is not straightforward to
obfuscate the controller parameters with additive homomorphic
encryption because multiplication between two data cannot be
executed in ciphertext. Furthermore, additive and fully homo-
morphic encryptions require a large number of computational
resources for homomorphic operation. Thus, these encryption
schemes are not suitable for lower-layer control of mechanical
systems.
Another approach to security enhancement of fog computing-
based control systems was proposed in [24]. In this method,
an artificial noise is added to sensor data, and a controller
in the fog determines the control input required to achieve
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Fig. 1. Concept of the fog computing-based control system with the public
cloud.
mean-square asymptotic stability. However, unlike the method
of [17], the controller parameters and control inputs are not
concealed.
This letter focuses on the development of a fog computing-
based encrypted control system with the aim to realize secure
modern control systems, e.g., Fig. 1. The developed system uses
a basic PID controller encrypted by ElGamal encryption for
position control of a linear stage. In the previous studies [25],
[26], although the feasibility and property of the encrypted
control systems have been evaluated through implementations
on Raspberry Pi, validity has not been investigated in realistic
settings such as an environment using industrial equipment and
networks. This letter demonstrates the first implementation of
the encrypted control system that is more representative of a
real environment in factories. The effects of the load fluctuation
and real-time property are validated. The PID gains and stage
position, as well as a reference signal, are encrypted in the
developed system. Additionally, control inputs in ciphertext are
determined by using the relevant ciphertext without decryption
in the fog. The experimental results confirm that the proposed
control system retains the stability and control performance of
the original unencrypted control system even when the controller
encryption method is applied.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the controller encryption method and provides a
state-space representation of a discrete-time PID controller.
Section III describes the concept of a fog computing-based
control system. The network architecture and the specifications
of the developed system, and C language library to implement an
encrypted controller are explained. Section IV presents the ex-
perimental results of confirming that controller parameters and
signals are concealed by encryption. Performance degradation
due to controller encryption and the effect of load fluctuation for
the stability of the encrypted control system are also examined.
Furthermore, the processing time of the developed system is
investigated. Section V describes conclusions and future works.
II. ENCRYPTED PID CONTROLLER
This section summarizes the controller encryption method us-
ing ElGamal encryption in [17] and introduces a state-space rep-
resentation of PID controller for the method. Since the ElGamal
cryptosystem uses a randomized parameter for the encryption, it
is a more secure public-key encryption scheme compared with
the RSA cryptosystem [27].
A. Controller Encryption
A plant P and a controller f are given as follows:
P :
{
xk+1 = Axk +Buk,
yk = Cxk,
f :
{
zk+1 = Aczk +Bcvk,
uk = Cczk +Dcvk,
(1)
where x is a state, u is an input, y is an output, A, B, and C are
plant parameters, z is a controller state, v is a controller input,
and Ac, Bc, Cc, and Dc are controller parameters. (1) can be
rewritten as follows:
ψk = Φξk =: f(Φ, ξk), (2)
ψk :=
[
zk+1
uk
]
, Φ :=
[
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
]
, ξk :=
[
zk
vk
]
.
A map Q for translation to a plaintext space M is defined as
follows:
Q : R  x → x̄ = γx+ a ∈ M, a :=
{
0, x ≥ 0,
p, x < 0,
where a scaling parameter γ ∈ R is given by key length λ, ·
is a function that rounds to the nearest element in M, and p is
a modulo parameter used in operations of ElGamal encryption.
Since Q operates as a quantizer, it causes quantization errors,
but if λ increases, the quantization errors decrease [28].
Definition 1: It is assumed that f of (2) is given as f = f+ ◦
f× [17]. Additionally, ξ is encrypted by a modified ElGamal
encryption scheme E+ = (Gen,Enc,Dec+) with Dec+ = f+ ◦
Dec. Under this assumption, an encrypted controller is defined
as the following map:
f×E+ :
(
Enc
(
Φ̄
)
, Enc
(
ξ̄
)) → Enc (Ψ̄) ,
where f×(Φ, ξ) = Ψ and Dec+(Enc(Ψ̄)) = ψ̄.
In the conventional cloud-based control systems, only the
signals over networks are encrypted, and the controller gains
and structure are not concealed. Therefore, if the adversaries
invade the cloud, they can steal the controller’s recipes and easily
estimate the dynamics of the plant. In contrast, in the encrypted
control system, the control input in ciphertext is calculated from
encrypted gains and encrypted signals without decryption, and
thus, the information is protected.
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B. State-Space PID Controller
The state-space representation of a discrete-time PID con-
troller is written as follows:
Ac =
[
0 0
0 1
]
, Bc =
[
1 −1
Ts −Ts
]
, Cc =
[
−KD
Ts
KI
]
,
Dc =
[
KP +KITs +
KD
Ts
−
(
KP +KITs +
KD
Ts
)]
,
zk =
[
ek−1
wk−1
]
, vk =
[
rk
yk
]
,
where KP is a proportional gain, KI is an integral gain, KD is
a derivative gain, and Ts is a sampling period, r is a reference,
e is an error between r and y, and w is an integrated value of e.
In the proposed system,Ac,Bc, Cc,Dc, z, and v are encrypted.
Encrypting of the controller parameters can only be realized by
using homomorphic encryption, which allows multiplication in
ciphertext.
III. DEVELOPED SYSTEM
This section introduces the architecture of the cloud and fog
computing-based control system as well as its specifications.
Furthermore, a C language library for the encrypted control is
described.
A. Concept
Fig. 1 illustrates a concept of the fog computing-based control
system with a Public cloud [29]. Company A administrates
a cloud infrastructure and provides a platform to operate the
higher-layer control. Company B, C, and D manage fog con-
nected to the cloud and each other. Company B and C may be
branches of Company D, and they aim to control devices, which
include some actuators and are owned by each company. An
operator sends tasks for the higher-layer control to an application
in the cloud. The application generates reference signals to im-
plement the tasks and transfers them to the fog. The fog decides
the input signals from the reference signals and sensor data of
the devices in real time. Additionally, the fog handles operating
data and transfers them to the cloud. The cloud storages the data
and visualizes them with a web interface for the operator.
B. Architecture
This letter focuses on developing the fog computing-based
control system within the blue frame seen in Fig. 1. Fig. 2
illustrates the network architecture of the developed system.
We use personal computers for a fog-computing environment
and the interface between a controlled device and the network.
The computers are connected to L2 switches, which in turn are
connected to an L3 switch via an Ethernet cable. Additionally,
as per the requirements of a logical network, both computers are
installed in the same VLAN.
The computers communicate with each other by TCP/IP
socket communication, and the L3 switch addresses routing
decisions. Scientific Linux, which is compatible with RedHat
Fig. 2. Network architecture of the developed system.
TABLE I
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE DEVELOPED SYSTEM
Enterprise Linux (RHEL), is used as the operating system for the
computers. The computers are also equipped with the Advanced
Robot Control System (ARCS) [30], a framework for real-time
computation of the lower-layer control system.
C. Specifications
The developed system consists of a motor-driven stage, the
plant-side computer, and the fog-side computer. Their specifi-
cations are described in Table I. Motor-driven stages or linear
actuators are major components for factory automation. The
stage is moved by an AC servo motor through a slide screw,
as shown in Fig. 3(a), and the AC motor and the slide screw
are connected via a coupling. The AC motor with the attached
rotary encoder is driven by the servo amplifier, and we use the
servo amplifier as a current controller as it has sufficient control
bandwidth. Note that although the developed system uses a slide
screw, the security enhancement method in Section II can also
be applied to a system that uses a ball screw or other linear
actuators.
TERANISHI et al.: DEVELOPMENT AND EXAMINATION OF FOG COMPUTING-BASED ENCRYPTED CONTROL SYSTEM 4645
Fig. 3. Plant in the developed system. (a) View of the whole plant. (b) View
of the whole plant with a 10 kg load.
Fig. 4. Control flow of the developed system.
D. C Language Library
This letter also develops a C language library to execute
encrypted control. This library contains five functions, Gen,
Enc, Dec+, Round and Mult. These functions operate based
on BIGNUM library in OpenSSL to address multiple-precision
integers. Gen searches a safe prime from a given key length,
and then, it generates a public key pk and a secret key sk based
on the safe prime. Enc encrypts each element of a matrix or
vector by using pk, and Dec+ restores a plaintext vector from
an encrypted matrix by using sk. The matrix or vector used in
Enc is rounded into a plaintext space by Round, a function that
corresponds to Q. Mult calculates the Hadamard product of an
encrypted matrix and an encrypted vector.
Fig. 4 illustrates the process in the developed system using the
developed C library. The plant-side computer obtains a current
position from the rotary encoder through the counter board and
the servo amplifier. Then, the plant-side computer converts the
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR ENCRYPTION
current position, reference input, and controller states, which
are double-precision floating-point data, into multiple-precision
integers by using Round. The converted data are encrypted
by Enc, and they are sent to the fog-side computer. The fog-
side computer decides a control input in ciphertext from the
encrypted data and encrypted controller parameters by using
Mult. Additionally, the fog-side computer returns the ciphertext
of the control input to the plant-side computer. The plant-side
computer decrypts the ciphertext by using Dec+, and then,
inputs a command voltage into the servo amplifier through the
D/A board. Note that Gen should be executed to obtain a key
pair before the abovementioned periodic control process, and
the encrypted controller parameters should be set in advance.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the results of some experiments for
validating the developed system. Effect of load fluctuation and
real-time computation in the proposed system are also indicated.
A. Performance Degradation and System Concealment
It is well known that the addition of a quantizer in a control
loop decreases the performance of the control system. Thus,
the control performance of the encrypted PID control system is
expected to be worse than that of a normal PID control system
because Q acts as a quantizer. This study includes investigation
of the control performance deterioration caused by encryption
in order to confirm the practicality of the proposed system. The
validations of the gain and signal concealment are also included,
and the conditions of this experiment are listed in Table II.
A model of the plant shown in Fig. 3(a) is obtained by system
identification as follows:
A =
[
1 0.0002
0 0.9959
]
, B =
[
0.0009
8.9008
]
, C =
[
1 0
]
,
where Ts is set to 10 ms. In addition, PID controller gains are
tuned manually asKP = 0.01,KI = 0.001, andKD = 0.0005,
and gain Φ is represented as follows:
Φ =
⎡
⎢⎣ 0 0 1 −10 1 0.01 −0.01
−0.05 0.001 0.06001 −0.06001
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Thus, the encrypted controller gain with a 64 bit key is given
as bottom of the next page, where the elements of Enc(Φ̄) are
displayed as hexadecimal numbers.
Fig. 5 shows the results of the tracking control whose refer-
ence input is a stair wave. The position of the stage is detected
by a motion capture camera every 10 ms. Figs. 5(a)(b) show the
results of the encrypted and unencrypted PID control. It can be
seen that the stability of closed-loop systems is retained even if
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Fig. 5. Comparison between the signals of the encrypted and unencrypted PID
controllers.
Fig. 6. Enc (ȳ) with the 64 bit key. (a) First element of Enc (ȳ). (b) Second
element of Enc (ȳ).
the PID controller is encrypted. Figs. 5(c)(d) show the absolute
value of errors between the input/output of the encrypted PID
control system and that of the unencrypted PID control system,
which are denoted as |ūk − uk| and |ȳk − yk|, respectively.
These figures show that the errors with the 64 bit key are smaller
than those with the 32 bit key. Thus, it is practically possible
to ignore the deterioration in the control performance due to
encryption when using a sufficient length key. Furthermore,
Fig. 6 shows the elements of Enc(ȳ) with the 64 bit key flowing
in the communication link. The encrypted controller conceals
the original signal.
Fig. 7. Comparison between the signals of the encrypted and unencrypted PID
controllers with the load.
B. Effect of Load Fluctuation
Industrial robots process various tasks by changing their end
effector according to the work content. Their model parameters
depend on their posture and hand mass. This parameter fluctua-
tion affects the performance of the tracking control and stability
of the control systems. Therefore, in order to apply the controller
encryption method to the control systems, it is necessary for the
encrypted control system to maintain stability under uncertain
conditions. This study examines the behavior of the developed
system with a 10 kg load on the stage, as shown in Fig. 3(b),
by conducting the same experiment as Section IV-A. This load
fluctuation affects the moment of inertia and the viscous friction
of the stage, leading to a change in the time constant.
Fig. 7 shows the results of the tracking control with the load.
These results are similar to those in Fig. 5, which means that
the performance of the encrypted controller is independent of
uncertainty due to load fluctuations. In other words, the stability
of the encrypted control system with sufficient length key is
determined only by the original controller properties.
C. Processing Time
A key of longer length makes the ciphertext stronger. On
the other hand, the encrypted controller increases processing
time as the key length increases. Hence, the key length cannot
be increased indiscriminately because real-time computation is
Enc
(
Φ̄
)
=
⎛
⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎣586A58C24B3AA933 7EC78FF4FE079B6A 0335DB4BE5C2638B 29D977C6743E4DE882F57F31DCBC5782 95EBC813B201A385 888C054705C9D2A1 4D98C5AD7E70FE18
EEF2190C8730E276 7AA6409B900A96B9 F0550B325FF6EE13 9FB1FB28014B73FD
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
⎡
⎢⎣BA7F03BA5E19484C 6ACB8DB11E60EB50 5C96D96061699DBE 67813112DFE9C04E5AE01791C824BD5D 97CF692792618658 9163C3D88AFA1FCE C6208087836E10EF
927E0383346D74CA CFC1B173BDDD228D 147B114E897FF840 AE1D7F44870921C1
⎤
⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
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TABLE III
PROCESSING TIME AT THE PLANT SIDE
TABLE IV
PROCESSING TIME AT THE FOG SIDE
Fig. 8. Processing time excluding communication delay in the developed
system.
critical for industrial control systems. This study measures the
time taken to execute the encrypted control in the developed
system with the library, and describes the relationship between
the key length and processing time. The key length is changed
from 32 bits to 1024 bits, and the processing time, excluding
the communication time, is measured 100,000 times for each
key length. Then, the maximum processing time, minimum
processing time, and mean processing time are obtained.
Table III and Table IV list the results of the processing time,
and Fig. 8 visualizes these results. The times for the plant side in
Fig. 8(a) increase exponentially with the key length. In contrast,
the times of fog side in Fig. 8(b) are almost proportional to
it. These results indicate that the increase in processing time
required for Enc and Dec+ is large compared to Mult. Note that
the results cannot be compared with the processing time of other
methods because the proposed system is the first implementation
of an encrypted control system in the practical setting. Although
we need more examination, the results are useful to choose the
appropriate key length.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter develops a secure fog computing-based control
system, which serves as the first implementation of an encrypted
control system in an actual industrial setting. The controller gain
and signals are concealed against adversaries. The developed
system is resilient to eavesdropping attacks and prevents zero
dynamics attacks. Thus, the controller encryption method can be
employed as a new component of defense in depth for industrial
control systems.
The experiment results confirm the feasibility of tracking
control under load fluctuation and indicate the relationship be-
tween the key length and processing time. The results in Section
IV-A and IV-B suggest that the controller encryption method
is sufficiently practical. From the viewpoint of security level
and control performance degradation, the key length should be
large. However, the results in Section IV-C suggest that the
key length is restricted by the processing time, especially the
time of encryption and decryption. Therefore, the processes
of encryption and decryption need to be implemented in the
hardware (e.g., via a field programmable gate array) so that the
encrypted control systems can be put to practical use in a more
resource-limited setting.
In future work, we will consider a fog computing-based con-
trol system with the cloud for higher-layer control. Additionally,
we will implement an attack detection method [19] to prevent
DoS attacks, gain falsifications, and replay attacks.
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